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Abstract
We consider truthful implementation of the socially e¢ cient allocation in an independent
private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a
suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent.
In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex-post incentive and ex-post participation constraints
are satis…ed for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it
is the unique mechanism satisfying ex-post incentive, ex-post participation and e¢ cient exit
conditions.
We develop the dynamic pivot mechanism in detail for a repeated auction of a single object
in which each bidder learns over time her true valuation of the object. The dynamic pivot
mechanism here is equivalent to a modi…ed second price auction.
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Introduction

In this paper, we generalize the idea of the pivot mechanism (due to Green and
La¤ont (1977)) to dynamic environments with private information. We design an
intertemporal sequence of transfer payments which allows each agent to receive her
‡ow marginal contribution in every period. In other words, after each history, the
expected transfer that each agent must pay coincides with the dynamic externality
cost that she imposes on the other agents. In consequence, each agent is willing to
truthfully report her information in every period.
We consider a general intertemporal model in discrete time and with a common
discount factor. The private information of each agent in each period is her perception
of her future payo¤ path conditional on the realized signals and allocations. We
assume throughout that the information is statistically independent across agents.
At the reporting stage of the direct mechanism, each agent reports her information.
The planner then calculates the e¢ cient allocation given the reported information.
The planner also calculates for each agent i the optimal allocation when agent i is
excluded from the mechanism. The total expected discounted payment of each agent
is set equal to the externality cost imposed on the other agents in the model. In this
manner, each agent receives as her payment her marginal contribution to the social
welfare in every conceivable continuation game.
With transferable utilities, the social objective is simply to maximize the expected
discounted sum of the individual utilities. Since this is essentially a dynamic programming problem, the solution is by construction time-consistent. In consequence, the
dynamic pivot mechanism is time-consistent and the social choice function can be
implemented by a sequential mechanism without any ex-ante commitment by the
designer (apart from the commitment to the transfers promised for the current period). In contrast, in revenue-maximizing problems, it is well-known that the optimal
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solution relies critically on the ability of the principal to commit to a contract, see
Baron and Besanko (1984). Interestingly, Battaglini (2005) shows that in dynamic
revenue-maximizing problems with stochastic types, the commitment problems are
less severe than with constant types.
The dynamic pivot mechanism yields a positive monetary surplus for the planner
in each period, and therefore the planner does not need outside resources to achieve
the e¢ cient allocation. Finally, the dynamic pivot mechanism induces all agents to
participate in the mechanism after all histories.
In the intertemporal environment there are many transfer schemes that support
the same incentives as the pivot mechanism. In particular, the monetary transfers
necessary to induce the e¢ cient action in period t may become due at some later
period s provided that the net present value of the transfers remains constant. We
say that a mechanism supports e¢ cient exit if an agent who ceases to a¤ect the current and future allocations also ceases to pay and receive transfers. This condition is
similar to the requirement often made in the scheduling literature that the mechanism
be an online mechanism (see Lavi and Nisan (2000)). We establish that in an environment with diverse preferences, the dynamic pivot mechanism is the only e¢ cient
mechanism that satis…es ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post participation and
e¢ cient exit conditions.
The basic idea of the dynamic pivot mechanism is …rst explored in the context
of a scheduling problem where a set of privately informed bidders compete for the
services of a central facility over time. This class of problems is perhaps the most
natural dynamic allocation analogue to the static single-unit auction. The scheduling
problem is kept deliberately simple and all the relevant private information arrives in
the initial period. Subsequently, we use the dynamic pivot mechanism to derive the
dynamic auction format for a model where bidders learn their valuations for a single
object over time. In contrast to the scheduling problem where a static mechanism
3

could still have implemented the e¢ cient solution, a static mechanism now necessarily
fails to support the e¢ cient outcome as more information arrives over time. In turn,
this requires a more complete understanding of the intertemporal trade-o¤s in the
allocation process. By computing the dynamic marginal contributions, we can derive
explicit and informative expressions for the intertemporal transfer prices.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written with the aim to explore various issues arising in dynamic allocation problems. Among the contributions which
focus on socially e¢ cient allocation, Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2006) propose a
Markovian environment for general allocation problems and analyze two di¤erent
classes of sequential incentives schemes: (i) Groves-like payments and (ii) Pivot-like
payments. They establish that Groves-like payments, which award every agent positive monetary transfers equal to the sum of the valuation of all other agents, guarantee
interim incentive compatibility and ex post participation constraints after all histories. In contrast, Pivot-like payments guarantee interim incentive compatibility and
ex-ante participation constraints. Athey and Segal (2007) consider a more general
dynamic model in which the current payo¤s are allowed to depend on the entire past
history including past signals and past actions. In addition they also allow for hidden
action as well as hidden information. The main focus of their analysis is on incentive
compatible mechanisms that are budget balanced in every period of the game. Their
mechanism, called balanced team mechanism, transfers the insight from the Arrow
(1979) and D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) mechanisms into a dynamic environment. In addition, Athey and Segal (2007) present conditions in terms of ergodic
distributions over types and patients agents such that insights from repeated games
can be employed to guarantee interim participation constraints. In contrast, we emphasize voluntary participation without any assumptions about the discount factor
or the ergodicity of the type distributions. We also de…ne an e¢ cient exit condition
which allows us to single out the dynamic pivot mechanism in the class of e¢ cient
4

mechanisms.
The focus of the current paper is on the socially e¢ cient allocation, but a number
of recent papers have analyzed the design of dynamic revenue maximizing mechanisms, beginning with the seminal contributions by Baron and Besanko (1984) and
Courty and Li (2000) who consider the optimal intertemporal pricing policies with
private information in a setting with two periods. Battaglini (2005) considers the
revenue-maximizing long-term contract of a monopolist in a model with an in…nite
time horizon when the valuation of the buyer changes in a Markovian fashion over
time. In particular, Battaglini (2005) shows that the optimal continuation contracts
for a current high type are e¢ cient as his payo¤ is determined by the allocations for
the current low type (by incentive compatibility). The net payo¤s of the types then
have property related to the marginal contribution here. But as Battaglini (2005)
considers revenue maximizing contracts, the lowest type served receives zero utility,
and hence the notion of marginal contribution refers only to the additional utility
generated by higher types, holding the allocation constant, rather than the entire
incremental social value. Most recently, Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2008) develop a
general allocation model and derive the optimal dynamic revenue-maximizing mechanism. A common thread in these papers is a suitable generalization of the notion of
virtual utility to dynamic environments.

2

Model

Uncertainty We consider an environment with private and independent values in
a discrete-time, in…nite-horizon model. The ‡ow utility of agent i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig in
period t 2 N is determined by the current allocation at 2 A, the current monetary
transfer pi;t 2 R and a state variable

i;t

2

i.
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The von Neumann Morgenstern utility

function ui of agent i is quasi-linear in the monetary transfer:
ui (at ; pi;t ;

i;t )

, vi (at ;

i;t )

pi;t .

The current allocation at 2 A is an element of a …nite set A of possible allocations.
The state of the world
i.

i;t

for agent i is a general Markov process on the state space

The aggregate state is given by the vector
There is a common prior Fi (

The current state

i;t

t

=(

1;t ; :::; I;t )

regarding the initial type

i;0 )

with
i;0

=

I
i=1

of each agent i.

and the current action at de…ne a probability distribution for

next period state variables

i;t+1

on

i:

represented by a stochastic kernel Fi (

We assume that this distribution can be

i;t+1 ; i;t ; at ).

The utility functions ui ( ) and the probability transition functions Fi ( ; at ;
common knowledge at t = 0. The common prior Fi (
Fi (

i;t+1 ; i;t ; at )

i.

i;0 )

i;t )

are

and the stochastic kernels

are assumed to be independent across agents. At the beginning of

each period t, each agent i observes

i;t

privately. At the end of each period, an action

at 2 A is chosen and payo¤s for period t are realized. The asymmetric information is
therefore generated by the private observation of

i;t

in each period t. We observe that

by the independence of the priors and the stochastic kernels across i, the information
of agent i,

i;t+1 ,

does not depend on

j;t

for j 6= i. The expected absolute value of the

‡ow payo¤ is assumed to be bounded by some K < 1 for every i; a; and allocation
plan a0 :

! A:

Z

jvi (a0 ( 0 ) ; 0i )j dF ( 0 ; a; ) < K:

The nature of the state space

will depend on the application at hand. At this

point, we stress that the formulation accommodates the possibility of random arrival
or departure of the agents. The arrival or departure of agent i can be represented by
an inactive state

i;

where vi (at ; i ) = 0 for all at 2 A and a random time

agent i privately observes her transition in or out of the inactive state.

6

at which

Social E¢ ciency All agents discount the future with a common discount factor
;0<

< 1. The socially e¢ cient policy is obtained by maximizing the expected

discounted sum of valuations. Given the Markovian structure, the socially optimal
program starting in period t at state
W ( t ) , max
E
1
fas gs=t

t

"

can be written as:
1
X
s=t

s t

I
X

vi (as ;

i=1

#

i;s )

:

For notational ease, we shall omit the conditioning state in the expectation operator, when the conditioning event is obvious, as in the above, where E [ ] = E t [ ].
Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:
" I
#
X
W ( t ) = max E
vi (at ; i;t ) + EW ( t+1 ) :
at

i=1

The socially e¢ cient policy is denoted by a = fat g1
t=0 . The social externality cost
of agent i is determined by the social value in the absence of agent i:
"1
#
X
X
s t
W i ( t ) , max
E
vj (as ; j;s ) :
1
fas gs=t

s=t

j6=i

The e¢ cient policy when agent i is excluded is denoted by a
marginal contribution Mi ( t ) of agent i at signal
Mi ( t ) , W ( t )

W

i

t

is de…ned by:

i

( t) :

= a

1
i;t t=0

: The

(1)

The marginal contribution of agent i is the change in the social value due to the
addition of agent i.1
Mechanism and Equilibrium We focus attention on direct mechanisms which
truthfully implement the socially e¢ cient policy a . A dynamic direct mechanism asks
1

In symmetric information environments, we used the notion of marginal contribution to construct

e¢ cient equilibria in dynamic …rst price auctions, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2003), (2006).
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every agent i to report her state

i;t

in every period t. The report ri;t 2

i

may or may

not be truthful. The public history in period t is a sequence of reports and allocations
until period t

1, or ht = (r0 ; a0 ; r1 ; a1 ; :::rt 1 ; at 1 ), where each rs = (r1;s ; :::; rI;s ) is a

report pro…le of the I agents. The set of possible public histories in period t is denoted
by Ht . The sequence of reports by the agents is part of the public history and we
assume that the past reports of each agent are observable to all the agents. The private
history of agent i in period t consists of the public history and the sequence of private
observations until period t, or hi;t = (

i;0 ; r0 ; a0 ; i;1 ; r1 ; a1 ; :::; i;t 1 ; rt 1 ; at 1 ; i;t ) :

The set of possible private histories in period t is denoted by Hi;t . An (e¢ cient)
dynamic direct mechanism is represented by a family of allocations and monetary
transfers, fat ; pt g1
t=0 : at :

!

(A) ; and

p t : Ht

! RI . With the focus on

e¢ cient mechanisms, the allocation at depends only on the current (reported) state
rt 2

, while the transfer pt may depend on the entire public history.

A (pure) reporting strategy for agent i in period t is a mapping from the private
history into the state space: ri;t : Hi;t !

i.

For a given mechanism, the expected

payo¤ of agent i from reporting strategy ri = fri;t g1
t=0 given the strategies r
fr

1
i;t gt=0

i

=

is:
E

1
X

t

[vi (a (rt ) ;

i;t )

pi (ht ; rt )] :

t=0

Given the mechanism fat ; pt g1
t=0 and the reporting strategies r i , the optimal strategy
of bidder i can be stated recursively:
Vi (hi;t ) = max E fvi (at (ri;t ; r
ri;t 2

i;t ) ; i;t )

pi (ht ; ri;t ; r

i;t )

+ Vi (hi;t+1 )g :

i

The value function Vi (hi;t ) represents the continuation value of agent i given the current private history hi;t . We say that a dynamic direct mechanism is interim incentive
compatible, if for every agent and every history, truthtelling is a best response given
that all other agents report truthfully. We say that the dynamic direct mechanism
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is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if truthtelling is a best response regardless of
the history and the current state of the other agents.
In the dynamic context, the notion of ex-post incentive compatibility is quali…ed
by periodic as it is ex-post with respect to all signals received in period t, but not expost with respect to signals arriving after period t. The periodic quali…cation arises
in the dynamic environment as agent i may receive information at some later time
s > t such that in retrospect she would wish to change the allocation choice in t and
hence her report in t.
Finally we de…ne the periodic ex-post participation constraints of each agent. After
each history ht , each agent i may opt out (permanently) from the mechanism. The
value of the outside option is denoted Oi (hi;t ) and it is de…ned by the payo¤s that
agent i receives if the planner pursues the e¢ cient policy a

i

for the remaining agents.

The periodic participation constraint requires that each agent’s equilibrium payo¤
after each history weakly exceeds Oi (hi;t ). For the remainder of the text we shall
say that a mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational if it
satis…es the periodic ex-post incentive and participation constraints.

3

Scheduling: An Example

We consider the problem of allocating time to use a central facility among competing
agents. Each agent has a private valuation for the completion of a task which requires
the use of the central facility. The facility has a capacity constraint and can only
complete one task per period. The cost of delaying any task is given by the discount
rate

< 1: The agents are competing for the right to use the facility at the earliest

available time. The objective of the social planner is to sequence the tasks over
time so as to maximize the sum of the discounted utilities. In an early contribution,
Dolan (1978) developed a static mechanism to implement a class of related scheduling
9

problems with private information.
An allocation policy in this setting is a sequence of choices at 2 f0; 1; :::; Ig; where
at denotes the bidder chosen in period t: We allow for at = 0 and hence the possibility
that no bidder is selected in t. Each agent has only one task to complete and the
value

i;0

2 R+ of the task is constant over time and independent of the realization

time (except for discounting). The transition function is then given by:

i;t+1

8
< 0;
=
:

if at = i;
if at 6= i.

i;t

For this scheduling model, we …nd the marginal contribution of each agent and
derive the associated dynamic pivot mechanism. We determine the marginal contribution of bidder i by comparing the value of the social program with and without
i. With the constant valuations over time for all i, the optimal policy is given by
assigning in every period the alternative j with the highest remaining valuation. To
simplify notation, we de…ne the positive valuation vi ,

i;0 .

We may assume without

loss of generality (after relabelling) that the valuations vi are ordered with respect to
the index i: v1

0. Due to the descending order of valuations we identify

vI

each task i with the period i + 1 in which it is completed along the e¢ cient path:
W ( 0) =

I
X

t 1

vt .

(2)

t=1

Similarly, the e¢ cient program in the absence of task i assigns the tasks in ascending
order, but necessarily skips task i in the assignment process:
W

i

( 0) =

i 1
X

t 1

vt +

t=1

I 1
X

t 1

vt+1 :

(3)

t=i

By comparing the social program with and without i, (2) and (3), respectively, we
…nd that the assignments for agents j < i remain unchanged after i is removed, but
that each agent j > i is allocated the slot one period earlier than in the presence of
10

i. The marginal contribution of i from the point of view of period 0 is:
Mi ( 0 ) = W ( 0 )

W

i

( 0) =

I
X

t 1

(vt

vt+1 ) :

t=i

The social externality cost of agent i is established in a straightforward manner. At
time t = i

1, agent i completes her task and realizes the value vi . The immediate

opportunity cost is the next highest valuation vi+1 . But this overstates the externality,
because in the presence of i all less valuable tasks are realized one period later. The
externality cost of agent i is hence equal to the next valuable task vi+1 minus the
improvement in future allocations due to the delay of all tasks by one period:
pi ( t ) = vi+1

I
X

t i

(vt

vt+1 ) = (1

)

t=i+1

Since we have by construction vt

I
X

t i

vt+1 .

(4)

t=i

0, the externality cost of agent i in the

vt+1

intertemporal framework is less than in the corresponding single allocation problem
where it would be vi+1 . Consequently, the …nal expression states that the externality
of agent i is the cost of delay imposed on the remaining and less valuable tasks.2

4

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

We now construct the dynamic pivot mechanism for the general model described in
Section 2. The marginal contribution of agent i is her contribution to the social
value. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the marginal contribution will also be the
information rent that agent i can secure for herself if the planner wishes to implement
2

In the online supplementary material, we show that the socially e¢ cient scheduling can be

implemented through a bidding mechanism rather than the direct revelation mechanism used here.
In a recent and related contribution, Said (2008) uses the dynamic Pivot mechanism and a payo¤
equivalence result to construct bidding strategies in a sequence of ascending auctions with entry and
exit of the agents.
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the socially e¢ cient allocation. In a dynamic setting if agent i can secure her marginal
contribution in every continuation game of the mechanism, then she should be able
to receive the ‡ow marginal contribution mi ( t ) in every period. The ‡ow marginal
contribution accrues incrementally over time and is de…ned recursively:
Mi ( t ) = mi ( t ) + EMi (

t+1 ) :

The ‡ow marginal contribution can be expressed directly in terms of the social value
functions, using the de…nition of the marginal contribution given in (1), as:
mi ( t ) , W ( t )

W

i

( t)

E [W (

t+1 )

W

i

(

t+1 )] .

(5)

The continuation payo¤s of the social programs with and without i, respectively, may
be governed by di¤erent transition probabilities as the respective social decisions in
period t, at , a ( t ) and a

i;t

,a

i

(

i;t ),

may di¤er. The continuation value of the

socially optimal program, conditional on current allocation at and state
W(

t+1

jat ;

where the transition from state

t

t)

, EF (

to state

t+1 ;at ; t )

t+1

W(

t

is:

t+1 ) ;

is controlled by the allocation at . For

notational ease we omit the expectations operator E from the conditional expectation.
We adopt the same notation for the marginal contributions Mi ( ) and the individual
value functions Vi ( ). The ‡ow marginal contribution mi ( t ) is expressed as:
mi ( t ) =

I
X
j=1

vj (at ;

j;t )

X

vj a

i;t ; j;t

+

W

j6=i

i

(

t+1

jat ;

t)

W

i

t+1

a

i;t ; t

A monetary transfer pi ( t ) such that the resulting ‡ow net utility matches the
‡ow marginal contribution leads agent i to internalize her social externalities:
pi ( t ) , vi (at ;

12

i;t )

mi ( t ) :

(6)

.

We refer to pi ( t ) as the transfer of the dynamic pivot mechanism. The transfer
pi ( t ) depends only on the current report

t

and not on the entire public history ht .

We can express pi ( t ) in terms of the ‡ow utilities and the social continuation values:
X
pi ( t ) =
vj a i;t ; j;t vj (at ; j;t ) + W i t+1 a i;t ; t W i ( t+1 jat ; t ) :
j6=i

(7)

The transfer pi ( t ) for agent i depends on the report of agent i only through the determination of the social allocation which is a prominent feature of the static VickreyClarke-Groves mechanisms. The monetary transfers pi ( t ) are always non-negative
as the policy a

i;t

is by de…nition an optimal policy to maximize the social value of

all agents exclusive of i. It follows that in every period t the sum of the monetary
transfers across all agents generates a weak budget surplus.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Pivot Mechanism)
The dynamic pivot mechanism fat ; pt g1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational.
Proof. By the unimprovability principle, it su¢ ces to prove that if agent i receives
as her continuation value her marginal contribution, then truthtelling is incentive
compatible for agent i in period t, or:
vi (a ( t ) ;
vi (a (ri;t ;
for all ri;t 2

i

i;t )

pi ( t ) + Mi (

i;t ) ; i;t )

and all

i;t

2

pi (ri;t ;

t+1

jat ;

i;t )

+ Mi (

(8)

t)
t+1

ja (ri;t ;

i;t ) ; t ) ;

and we recall that we denote the socially e¢ cient

i

allocation at the true state pro…le

t

by at , a ( t ). By construction of pi in (7),

the lhs of (8) represents the marginal contribution of agent i. We can express the
marginal contributions Mi ( ) in terms of the di¤erent social values to get:
W ( t)

W

+ (W (

t+1

i

( t)

ja (ri;t ;

vi (a (ri;t ;
i;t ) ; t )
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i;t ) ; i;t )

W

i

(

t+1

pi (ri;t ;
ja (ri;t ;

i;t )
i;t ) ; t )) :

(9)

We then insert the transfer price pi (ri;t ;
W ( t)
+

X

W

i ( t)

vi (a (ri;t ;

i;t ),

i;t ) ;

i;t )

see (7), into (9) to obtain:
X

vj a

i;t ; j;t

W

i

t+1

i;t ; t

a

j6=i

vj (a (ri;t ;

i;t ) ; j;t )

+ W(

t+1

j6=i

ja (ri;t ;

i;t ) ; t ) :

But now we reconstitute the entire inequality in terms of the respective social values:
W ( t) W

i

( t)

I
X

vj (a (ri;t ;

i;t ) ; j;t )+

W(

t+1

j=1

ja (ri;t ;

i;t ) ; t )

W

The above inequality holds for all ri;t by the social optimality of a ( t ) in state

i

( t) :
t.

The dynamic pivot mechanism speci…es a unique monetary transfer after every
history. It guarantees that the ex-post incentive and ex-post participation constraints
are satis…ed after every history. In the intertemporal environment, each agent evaluates the monetary transfers to be paid in terms of the expected discounted transfers,
but is indi¤erent (up to discounting) over the incidence of the transfers over time.
This temporal separation between allocative decisions and monetary decisions may
be undesirable for many reasons. First, if the agents and the principal do not have
the ability to commit to future transfer payments, then delays in payments become
problematic. In consequence, an agent who is not pivotal should not receive or make
a payment. Second, if it is costly (in a lexicographic sense) to maintain accounts of
future monetary commitments, then the principal wants to close down (as early as
possible) the accounts of those agents who are no longer pivotal.3
This motivates the following e¢ cient exit condition. Let state

i

in period

i

be

such that the probability that agent i a¤ects the e¢ cient social decision at in period
t is equal to zero for all t

i,

i.e. Pr

t

at ( t ) 6= a

agent i is irrelevant for the mechanism in period
3

i,

i;t

( t) j

i

= 0. In this case,

and we say that the mechanism

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to consider the link between

exit and uniqueness of the transfer rule.
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satis…es the e¢ cient exit condition if agents neither make nor receive transfers in
periods where they are irrelevant for the mechanism.
De…nition 1 (E¢ cient Exit)
A dynamic direct mechanism satis…es the e¢ cient exit condition if for all i; h i ;
pi (h i ;

i

i

:

) = 0:

We establish the uniqueness of the dynamic pivot mechanism in an environment
with diverse preferences and the e¢ cient exit condition. The assumption of diverse
preferences allows for rich preferences over the current allocations and indi¤erence
over future allocations.
Assumption 1 (Diverse Preferences)
1. For all i, there exists

i2

i

such that for all a, vi (a; i ) = 0 and Fi ( i ; a; i ) = 1:

2. For all i; a and x 2 R+ , there exists

and for all at ; Fi ( i ; at ;

a;x
i

2

i

such that

8
< x; if a = a;
t
vi (at ; a;x
)
=
i
: 0; if a 6= a;
t
a;x
i )

= 1.

The diverse preference assumption assigns to each agent i a state,

i,

which is

an absorbing state and in which i gets no payo¤ from any allocation. In addition,
each agent i has a state in which i has a positive valuation x for a speci…c current
allocation a and no value for other current or any future allocations. The diverse
preferences condition is similar to the rich domain conditions introduced in Green and
La¤ont (1977) and Moulin (1986) to establish the uniqueness of the Groves and the
Pivot mechanism in a static environment. Relative to their conditions, we augment
the diverse (‡ow) preferences with the certain transition into the absorbing state
15

i.

With this transition we ensure that the diverse ‡ow preferences continue to matter
in the intertemporal environment.
The assumption of diverse preference in conjunction with the e¢ cient exit condition guarantees that in every dynamic direct mechanism there are some types,
a;x
i

speci…cally the types of the form

, that receive exactly the ‡ow transfers they

would have received in the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Lemma 1
If fat ; pt g1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational, and satis…es
the e¢ cient exit condition, then:
pi (ht ;

a;x
i ;

i;t )

= pi (

a;x
i ;

i;t ) ,

for all i; a; x;

i;t ; ht .

Proof. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, if the valuation x of type

a;x
i

for

allocation a exceeds the social externality cost, that is
x

W

i(

X

i;t )

vj (a;

j;t )

W

i

(

j6=i

then pi (

a;x
i ;

i;t )

i;t+1

ja;

i;t ) ,

(10)

is equal to the above social externality cost, otherwise it is zero.

We now argue by contradiction. By the ex-post incentive compatibility constraints, all types

a;x
i

of agent i where x satis…es the inequality (10) must pay the

same transfer. To see this, suppose that for some x; y 2 R+ satisfying (10), we have
a;x
i ;

i;t )

port ri;t =

a;x
i ,

pi (ht ;

< pi (ht ;

a;y
i ;

Now type

a;y
i

has a strict incentive to misre-

a contradiction. We therefore denote the transfer for all x and

satisfying (10) by pi (ht ; a;
pi (a;

i;t ).

i;t )

a;x
i

and the corresponding dynamic pivot transfer by

i;t ).

Suppose next that pi (ht ; a;

i;t )

> pi (a;

i;t ).

participation constraint for some x with pi (ht ; a;

This implies that the ex-post
i;t )

> x > pi (a;

i;t )

is vio-

lated, contradicting the hypothesis of the lemma. Suppose to the contrary that
16

pi (ht ; a;

i;t )

< pi (a;

i;t ),

a;x
i

and consider the incentive constraints of a type

with a valuation x such that
pi (ht ; a;

i;t )

< x < pi (a;

If the inequality (11) is satis…ed then it follows that a (
in particular that a (

a;x
i ;

i;t )

(11)

i;t ) :
a;x
i ;

i;t ),

and

6= a. If the ex-post incentive constraint of type

a;x
i

i;t )

=a

i

(

were satis…ed, then we would have
vi (a (
Given that

a;x
i ;

i

=

a;x
i;t ) ; i )
a;x
i ,

pi (ht ;

a;x
i ;

i;t )

we rewrite (12) as 0

given (11), this implies that pi (ht ;

vi (a;

pi (ht ;

a;x
i ;

i;t )

a;x
i ;

a;x
i )

i;t )

pi (ht ; a;
x

i;t ) .

pi (ht ; a;

< 0. In other words, type

(12)
But

i;t ).

a;x
i

receives a

strictly positive subsidy even though her report is not pivotal for the social allocation
as a (

a;x
i ;

i;t )

=a

i

(

i;t ).

Now, a positive subsidy violates the ex-post incentive

constraint of the absorbing type

i.

By the e¢ cient exit condition, type

i

should not

receive any contemporaneous (or future) subsidies. But by misreporting her type to
be

a;x
i ,

type

i

would gain access to a positive subsidy without changing the social

allocation. It thus follows that pi (ht ;

a;x
i ;

i;t )

= pi (

a;x
i ;

i;t )

for all a and all x.

Given that the transfers of the dynamic pivot mechanism are part of every dynamic
direct mechanism with diverse preferences, we next establish that every type

i;0

in t = 0 has to receive the same ex-ante expected utility as in the dynamic pivot
mechanism.
Lemma 2
If fat ; pt g1
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational, and satis…es
the e¢ cient exit condition, then for all i and all

0:

Vi ( 0 ) = Mi ( 0 ).

Proof. The argument is by contradiction. Consider i such that Vi ( 0 ) 6= Mi ( 0 ).
Suppose …rst that Vi ( 0 ) > Mi ( 0 ). Then there is a history h and a state
17

such

) < pi ( ). We show that such a transfer pi (h ;

that pi (h ;

a;x
i

of the ex-post incentive constraint for some type
a ;x
i

incentive constraint of a type
vi (a (

a ;x
;
i

vi (a (

i;

;

i;
i;

a ;x
)
i

);

);

a ;x
)
i

with pi (h ;

pi (h ;
pi (h ;

By hypothesis, we have pi (h ;

a ;x
;
i

a ;x
i

) + Vi (hi;

i;

+1

ja (

a ;x
;
i

has only a positive valuation for a (

pi (h ;

Speci…cally consider the

+1

ja (

;

i;

i;

a ;x
;
i

i;

a ;x
;
i

); (

); (
i;

i;

:

a ;x
;
i

i;

;

i;

) 6= a (

i;

), it follows that the lhs of (13)
i;

;

i;

i;

);

;

i;

a ;x
)
i

). But as the

pi (h ;

)=

) > 0, leading to a contradiction.

Suppose next that for some " > 0, we have:
Mi ( 0 )

(14)

Vi ( 0 ) > ":

By hypothesis of ex-post incentive compatibility we have for all reports ri;0 :
Mi ( 0 ) [vi (a (ri;0 ;

i;0 ) ; i;0 )

pi (h0 ; ri;0 ;

i;0 )

+ Vi (hi;1 ja (ri;0 ;

Given a0 , we can …nd, by the diverse preference condition, a type
a0 = a (
ri;0 =

a0 ;x
;
i

a0 ;x
,
i

i;0 ).

i

=

i;0 ) ; i;0 )]
a0 ;x
i

> ".

such that

Now by Lemma 1, there exists a report ri;0 for agent i; namely

such that a0 is induced at the price pi ( 0 ). After inserting ri;0 =

the above inequality and observing that vi (a (ri;0 ;
mi ( 0 ), we conclude that Mi ( 1 )

Vi (hi;1 ja0 (ri;0 ;

i;0 ) ; i;0 )
i;0 ) ; i;0 )

pi (h0 ; ri;0 ;

a0 ;x
i

into

i;0 )

=

> "= .

But now we repeat the argument we started with (14) and …nd that there is a path
of realizations

0 ; :::; t ,

such that the di¤erence between the marginal contribution

and the value function of agent i grows without bound. But the marginal contribution
of agent i is …nite given that the expected ‡ow utility of agent i is bounded by
some K > 0, and thus eventually the ex-post participation constraint of the agent is
violated, and we obtain the desired contradiction.
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i;

))

(13)

))

) < x < pi ( ) and if x < pi ( ), then we can infer

is equal to zero. However, the rhs is equal to vi (a (
x

i.

) < x < pi ( ) at a misreport

) + Vi (hi;

from marginal contribution pricing that a (
type

2

) leads to a violation

The above lemma can be viewed as a revenue equivalence result of all (e¢ cient)
dynamic direct mechanisms. As we are analyzing a dynamic allocation problem with
an in…nite horizon, we cannot appeal to the revenue equivalence results established for
static mechanisms. In particular, the statement of the standard revenue equivalence
results involve a …xed utility for the lowest type. In the in…nite horizon model here,
the diverse preference assumption give us a natural candidate of a lowest type in terms
of

i,

and the e¢ cient exit condition determines her utility. The remaining task is

to argue that among all intertemporal transfers with the same expected discounted
value, only the time pro…le of the dynamic pivot mechanism satis…es the relevant
conditions. Alternative payments streams could either require an agent to pay earlier
or later relative to the dynamic pivot transfers. If the payments were to occur later,
payments would have to be lower in an earlier period by the above revenue equivalence
result. This would open the possibility for a “short-lived”type

a;x
i

to induce action a

at a price below the dynamic pivot transfer and hence violate incentive compatibility.
The reverse argument applies if the payments were to occur earlier relative to the
dynamic pivot transfer, for example if the agent were to be asked to post a bond at
the beginning of the mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness)
If the diverse preference condition is satis…ed and if fat ; pt g1
t=0 is ex-post incentive
compatible and individually rational, and satis…es the e¢ cient exit condition, then it
is the dynamic pivot mechanism.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose not, then by Lemma 2 there exists
an agent i, a history h and an associated state
Suppose …rst that pi (h ;
pi (h ;
type

i;

such that pi (h ;

) < pi ( ). We show that the current monetary transfer

) violates the ex-post incentive constraint of some type
a ;x
i

) 6= pi ( ).

a;x
i .

Consider now a

with a valuation x for the allocation a such that x > pi ( ). Her ex-post
19

incentive constraints are given by:
vi (a (

a;x
i ;

a;x
i;t ) ; i )

vi (a (ri;t ;
for all ri;t 2

i;t ) ; i;t )

i.

a;x
i ;

By Lemma 1, pi (ht ;

x

i;

pi (h ;

i;t )

+ Vi (hi;t+1 ja (

a;x
i ;

pi (ht ; ri;t ;

i;t )

+ Vi (hi;t+1 ja (ri;t ;

a;x
i;t ) ; ( i ;

i;t ))

a;x
i;t ) ; ( i ;

i;t )) ;

By the e¢ cient exit condition, we have for all ri;t :

Vi (hi;t+1 ja (

ri; =

a;x
i ;

pi (ht ;

a;x
i;t ) ; ( i ;
a;x
i ;
a;x
i .

by type

i;t )

i;t ))

= pi (

= Vi (hi;t+1 ja (ri;t ;

a;x
i ;

i;t )

a;x
i;t ) ; ( i ;

i;t ))

= 0:

= pi ( ). Consider then the misreport

The ex-post incentive constraint now reads: x

pi ( )

), which leads to a contradiction as by hypothesis we have pi (h ;

)<

pi ( ).
Suppose next that pi (h ;

) > pi ( ). Now by Lemma 2, it follows that the ex-

ante expected payo¤ is equal to the value of the marginal contribution of agent i in
period 0. It therefore follows from pi (h ;
time

0

and state

0

such that pi (h ;

) > pi ( ) that there also exists another

) < pi ( ). By repeating the argument in the

…rst part of the proof, we obtain a contradiction.
We should reiterate that in the de…nition of the ex-post incentive and participation
conditions, we required that a candidate mechanism satis…es these conditions after
all possible histories of past reports. It is in the spirit of the ex-post constraints that
these constraints hold for all possible states rather than strictly positive probability
events. In the context of establishing the uniqueness of the mechanism it allows us
to use the diverse preference condition without making additional assumption about
the transition probability from a given state

i;t

into a speci…c state

require the existence of these types in establishing the above result.
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a;x
i .

We merely

5

Learning and Licensing

In this section, we show how our general model can be interpreted as one where
the bidders learn gradually about their preferences for an object that is auctioned
repeatedly over time. We use the insights from the general pivot mechanism to
deduce properties of the e¢ cient allocation mechanism. A primary example of an
economic setting that …ts this model is the leasing of a resource or license over time.
In every period t; a single indivisible object can be allocated to a bidder i 2
f1; :::; Ig, and the allocation decision at 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig simply determines which bidder
gets the object in period t: In order to describe the uncertainty explicitly, we assume
that the true valuation of bidder i is given by ! i 2

i

= [0; 1]. Information in the

model represents therefore the bidder’s prior and posterior beliefs on ! i : In period 0,
bidder i does not know the realization of ! i , but she has a prior distribution
on

i.

The prior and posterior distributions on

i

i;0

(! i )

are assumed to be independent

across bidders. In each subsequent period t, only the winning bidder in period t
receives additional information leading to an updated posterior distribution

i;t

on

1
i

according to Bayes’rule. If bidder i does not win in period t, we assume that she gets
no information, and consequently the posterior is equal to the prior. In the dynamic
direct mechanism, the bidders simply report their posteriors at each stage.
The socially optimal assignment over time is a standard multi–armed bandit problem and the optimal policy is characterized by an index policy (see Whittle (1982)).
In particular, we can compute for every bidder i the index based exclusively on the
information about bidder i. The index of bidder i after private history hi;t is the
solution to the following optimal stopping problem:
Pi l
l=0 vi (at+l )
Pi l
i (hi;t ) = max E
i

;

l=0

where at+l is the path in which alternative i is chosen l times following a given past
allocation (a0 ; :::; at ). An important property of the index policy is that the index
21

of alternative i can be computed independent of any information about the other
alternatives. In particular, the index of bidder i remains constant if bidder i does not
win the object. The socially e¢ cient allocation policy a = fat g1
t=0 is to choose in
every period a bidder i if

i

(hi;t )

j

(hj;t ) for all j.

In the dynamic direct mechanism, we construct a transfer price such that under
the e¢ cient allocation, each bidder’s net payo¤ coincides with her ‡ow marginal
contribution mi ( t ). We consider …rst the payment of the bidder i who has the
highest index in state

and who should therefore receive the object in period t. In

t

order to match her net payo¤ to her ‡ow marginal contribution, we must have:
mi ( t ) = vi (hi;t )

(15)

pi ( t ) :

The remaining bidders, j 6= i, should not receive the object in period t and their
transfer price must o¤set the ‡ow marginal contribution: mj ( t ) =

pj ( t ). We

expand mi ( t ) by noting that i is the e¢ cient assignment and that another bidder,
say k, would be the e¢ cient assignment in the absence of i:
mi ( t ) = vi (hi;t )

vk (hk;t )

(W

i

(

t+1

ji;

t)

W

i

(

t+1

jk;

t )) :

The continuation value without i in t+1, but conditional on having assigned the object
to i in period t is simply equal to the value conditional on
W

i

t,

or W

i

(

t+1

ji;

t)

=

( t ). The additional information generated by the assignment to agent i only

pertains to agent i and hence has no value for the allocation problem once i is removed.
The ‡ow marginal contribution of the winning agent i is therefore:
mi ( t ) = vi (hi;t )
It follows that pi ( t ) = (1

)W

i

(1

)W

i

( t) :

( t ), which is the ‡ow externality cost of assigning

the object to agent i. A similar analysis leads to the conclusion that each losing bidder
makes zero payments: pj ( t ) =

mj ( t ) = 0.
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Theorem 3 (Dynamic Second Price Auction)
The socially e¢ cient allocation rule a is ex-post incentive compatible in the dynamic
direct mechanism with the payment rule p where:
8
< (1
) W j ( t)
pj ( t ) =
:
0

if at = j;
if at 6= j:

The incentive compatible pricing rule has a few interesting implications. First,

we observe that in the case of two bidders, the formula for the dynamic second price
reduces to the static solution. If we remove one bidder, the social program has no
other choice but to always assign it to the remaining bidder. But then, the expected
value of that assignment policy is simply equal to the expected value of the object for
bidder j in period t by the martingale property of the Bayesian posterior. In other
words, the transfer is equal to the current expected value of the next best competitor.
It should be noted, though, that the object is not necessarily assigned to the bidder
with the highest current ‡ow payo¤. With more than two bidders, the ‡ow value of
the social program without bidder i is di¤erent from the ‡ow value of any remaining
alternative. Since there are at least two bidders left after excluding i; the planner has
the option to abandon any chosen alternative if its value happens to fall su¢ ciently.
This option value increases the social ‡ow payo¤ and hence the transfer that the
e¢ cient bidder must pay. In consequence the social opportunity cost is higher than
the highest expected valuation among the remaining bidders.
Second, we observe that the transfer price of the winning bidder is independent
of her own information about the object. This means that for all periods in which
the ownership of the object does not change, the transfer price stays constant as well,
even though the value of the object to the winning bidder may change.
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6

Appendix: Online Supplementary Material

We show that the socially e¢ cient solution to the scheduling problem of
Section 3 in “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism”can be realized through a
bidding mechanism, speci…cally a dynamic version of the ascending price
auction, rather than a direct revelation mechanism. We also give a slight
modi…cation of the example where the bidding mechanism is ine¢ cient.

In the scheduling problem of Section 3 of “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism”, a
number of bidders compete for a scare resource, namely early access to a central
facility. We show here that the e¢ cient allocation can be realized through a bidding
mechanism rather than a direct revelation mechanism. We …nd a dynamic version of
the ascending price auction where the contemporaneous use of the facility is auctioned.
As a given task is completed, the number of e¤ective bidders decreases by one. We
can then use a backwards induction algorithm to determine the values for the bidders
starting from a …nal period in which only a single bidder is left without e¤ective
competition.
Consider then an ascending auction in which all tasks except that of bidder I
have been completed. Along the e¢ cient path, the …nal ascending auction will occur
at time t = I

1. Since all other bidders have vanished along the e¢ cient path at

this point, bidder I wins the …nal auction at a price equal to zero. By backwards
induction, we consider the penultimate auction in which the only bidders left are I

1

and I. As agent I can anticipate to win the auction tomorrow even if she were to
loose it today, she is willing to bid at most
bI (vI ) = vI

(vI
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0) ;

(16)

namely the net value gained by winning the auction today rather than tomorrow.
Naturally, a similar argument applies to bidder I
petition today bidder I

1, by dropping out of the com-

1 would get a net present discounted value of ! I

1

and

hence her maximal willingness to pay is given by
bI
Since bI

1

1

(vI 1 ) = vI

bI (vI ), given vI

(vI 1 )

ascending price auction in t = I

(vI

1

1

0) .

vI , it follows that bidder I

1

2 and receives a net payo¤:
vI

(1

1

) vI :

We proceed inductively and …nd that the maximal bid of bidder I
t=I

k

1 wins the

k in period

1 is given by:
bI

k

(vI

k)

In other words, bidder I

= vI

vI

k

bI

k

(k 1)

vI

(k 1)

(17)

k is willing to bid as much as to be indi¤erent between

being selected today and being selected tomorrow, when she would be able to realize
a net valuation of vI

k

bI

(k 1) ,

but only tomorrow, and so the net gain from being

selected today rather than tomorrow is:
vI
The maximal bid of bidder I

(k

k

vI

k

bI

(k 1)

1) generates the transfer price of bidder I

k and

by solving (17) recursively with the initial condition given by (16), we …nd that the
price in the ascending auction equals the externality cost in the direct mechanism. In
this class of scheduling problems, the e¢ cient allocation can therefore be implemented
by a bidding mechanism.4
4

The nature of the recursive bidding strategies bears some similarity to the construction of the

bidding strategies for multiple advertising slots in the keyword auction of Edelman, Ostrovsky, and
Schwartz (2007). In the auction for search keywords, the multiple slots are di¤erentiated by their
probability of receiving a hit and hence generating a value. In the scheduling model here, the
multiple slots are di¤erentiated by the time discount associated with di¤erent access times.
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We end this section with a minor modi…cation of the scheduling model to allow
for multiple tasks. For this purpose it is su¢ cient to consider an example with two
bidders. The …rst bidder has an in…nite series of single-period tasks, each delivering
a value of v1 . The second bidder has only a single task with a value v2 . The utility
function of bidder 1 is thus given by
8
< v if a = 1 for all t,
1
t
v1 (at ; 1;t ) =
: 0 if
otherwise.

whereas the utility function of bidder 2 is as described earlier.
The socially e¢ cient allocation in this setting either has at = 1 for all t if v1
or a0 = 2; at = 1 for all t

v2

1 if v1 < v2 : For the remainder of this example, we will

assume that v1 > v2 : Under this assumption the e¢ cient policy will never complete
the task of bidder 2. The marginal contribution of each bidder is:
M1 ( 0 ) = (v1

v2 ) +

1

v1 ;

and
M2 ( 0 ) = 0.
Along any e¢ cient allocation path, we have Mi ( 0 ) = Mi ( t ) for all i and the social
externality cost of agent 1, p1 ( t ) for all t, is p1 ( t ) = (1

) v2 . The externality cost

is again the cost of delay imposed on the competing bidder, namely (1

) times the

valuation of the competing bidder. This accurately represents the social externality
cost of agent 1 in every period even though agent 2 will never receive access to the
facility.
We contrast the e¢ cient allocation and transfer with the allocation resulting in
the dynamic ascending price auction. For this purpose, suppose that the equilibrium
path generated by the dynamic bidding mechanism would be e¢ cient. In this case
bidder 2 would never be chosen and hence would receive a net payo¤ of 0 along the
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equilibrium path. But this means that bidder 2 would be willing to bid up to v2 in
every period. In consequence the …rst bidder would receive a net payo¤ of v1

v2 in

every period and her discounted sum of payo¤ would then be:
1
1

(v1

v2 ) < M 1 ( 0 ) :

(18)

But more important than the failure of the marginal contribution is the fact that
the equilibrium will not support the e¢ cient assignment policy. To see this, notice
that if bidder 1 loses to bidder 2 in any single period, then the task of bidder 2 is
completed and bidder 2 will drop out of the auction in all future stages. Hence the
continuation payo¤ for bidder 1 from dropping out in a given period and allowing
bidder 2 to complete his task is given by:
(19)

v1 :

1

If we compare the continuation payo¤s (18) and (19) respectively, then we see that it
is bene…cial for bidder 1 to win the auction in all periods if and only if
v1

v2
1

but the e¢ ciency condition is simply v1

;

v2 . It follows that for a large range of

valuations, the outcome in the ascending auction is ine¢ cient and will assign the
object to bidder 2 despite the ine¢ ciency of this assignment. The reason for the
ine¢ ciency is easy to detect in this simple setting. The forward-looking bidders
consider only their individual net payo¤s in future periods. The planner on the other
hand is interested in the level of gross payo¤s in the future periods. As a result,
bidder 1 is strategically willing and able to depress the future value of bidder 2 by
letting bidder 2 win today to increase the future di¤erence in the valuations between
the two bidders. But from the point of view of the planner, the di¤erential gains for
bidder 1 are immaterial and the assignment to bidder 2 represents an ine¢ ciency.
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The rule of the ascending price auction, namely that the highest bidder wins, only
internalizes the individual equilibrium payo¤s but not the social payo¤s.
This small extension to multiple tasks shows that the logic of the marginal contribution mechanism can account for subtle intertemporal changes in the payo¤s. On
the other hand, common bidding mechanisms may not resolve the dynamic allocation
problem in an e¢ cient manner. Indirectly, it suggests that suitable indirect mechanisms have yet to be devised for scheduling and other sequential allocation problems.
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